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Bureau Chiefs

6 February 1953

Chiefs, FEIS

Unidentified Flying Objects

The following summary is being disseminated to the field as a matter of general information and interest:

1. The following conclusions are presented by a panel of Scientific Consultants called upon to evaluate any possible threat to the national security posed by Unidentified Flying Objects (flying saucers):

a. Evidence presented on Unidentified Flying Objects shows no indication that they constitute a direct physical threat to the national security, nor is there evidence that the phenomena indicate a need for the revision of current scientific concepts.

b. Continued emphasis on the reporting of this phenomena constitutes a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the Nation. Explosions, channels of communications are closed by irrelevant reports; continued false alarms lead to the ignoring of real indications of hostile actions; creation of a morbid national psychology in which skillful hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and harmful distrust of duly constituted authority.

2. To minimize the concomitant dangers above and to strengthen national facilities so that true indications of hostile actions may be recognized and appropriately handled, the Panel recommends:

a. That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have acquired.

b. That the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognize promptly and react effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action.

c. That an integrated program be designed to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence of hostile forces behind the phenomena, to train personnel to recognize and

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report false indications quickly and effectively, and
to strengthen regular channels for the evaluation of and
prompt reaction to true indications of hostile measures.

ALAN M. WAFFIELD

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